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The unique characteristics of the Internet-its openness, its global
interconnectedness, its decentralized nature, and the interrelationships
among the "layers" that comprise it -have made it remarkably resistant
to traditional tools of state governance. This is both good and bad.
Because the Internet often works around and beyond political
boundaries, efforts to censor Internet speech have proven difficult, as the
global tumult in repressive government regimes bears witness. The same
characteristics, however, can frustrate efforts by governments that want
to pursue legitimate social goals, such as combating child exploitation on
the Internet, reducing the use of the Internet to promote piracy and
counterfeiting, or ensuring the security of networks.'
* Joe Waz, president of Altura West LLC, a consulting firm based in Los Angeles, is a
retired communications industry executive and Senior Fellow at the Silicon Flatirons Center
for Law, Technology, and Entrepreneurship at the University of Colorado Law School. Phil
Weiser is the Dean and Thompson Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School
as well as Executive Director of the Silicon Flatirons Center on Law, Technology, and
Entrepreneurship. The authors thank the participants (see Appendix A) in the August 2011
roundtable on Internet governance for their many contributions, including helpful editorial
comments on earlier drafts. The authors also thank Kaleb Sieh for his research and editorial
support, and Elizabeth Hartman for her assistance in assembling preparatory readings for the
roundtable.
1. Establishing the norms that governments should use in determining which goals are
"legitimate" and how they are to be carried out will be an important and difficult public policy
challenge that is beyond the scope of this article..
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Much of the "governance" of the Internet is in fact carried out by
so-called "multistakeholder ("MSH") organizations" such as the Internet
Society and the World Wide Web Consortium. 2 Over the last two
decades, these entities have largely established the norms and standards
for the global Internet, but they are little known to the general public and
even to most regulators and legislators. Most governments do not
understand the essential role of MSH organizations. To develop an
effective Internet governance strategy, the origin, role, and operation of
MSH organizations must be better understood, as must the limits of such
organizations for "governing" an ever more complex Internet ecosystem.
It is important to ponder the meaning of "governance" when applied
to such MSH organizations. In a domestic context, to "govern" implies
the ability to enforce mandates. That is too limited a view in the context
of Internet governance as performed by MSH processes, which can range
from the "soft" power of rough consensus to the "hard" power of
international law and binding treaties.
The future of this unusual and largely successful form of Internet
governance is far from assured. In the fall of 2011, for example, the
government of India issued its call to place Internet governance under the
auspices of the UN, or, as some have characterized it, "in a box with a
UN label stamped on the side. 3 Other major countries, including Russia,
have offered similar suggestions.4 Whether this effort succeeds, or
whether the Internet's current governance model is permitted to develop
to meet new challenges, will, in the view of some observers, "very likely
decide the future ability of the Internet to continue on its extraordinary

2. The Internet Society-celebrating its 20th anniversary in April 2012-has under its
auspices the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet Architecture Board, and other
related bodies operate. See Celebrating 20 Years of Accomplishments, INTERNET SOCIETY,
http://www.isoc.org/isoc/20th/ (last visited July 21, 2012). The World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) develops standards for the web and recently announced a first draft standard for online
privacy. See W3C Announces First Draft of Standard for Online Piracy, W3C,
http://www.w3.org/201 i/i I/dnt-pr.html.en (last visited July 21, 2012).
3. Kieren McCarthy, India Formally Proposes Government Takeover ofInternet, .NXT
(Oct. 27, 2011), http://news.dot-nxt.com/2011/10/27/india-proposes-government-controlinternet; See also U.S. Callsfor Internet Freedom Amid India Plan, GOOGLE NEWS (Dec. 7,
2011), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h0BfQkpJMZlS Tc3fjs3VgH7
orciw?docld = CNG.8dc3992299cb598cecde0fffb 1db8bcd. Ic 1.
4. Bill Gertz, CybercommandChief Opposes U.N. Net Control, THE WASH.TIMES (Oct.
20, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011 /oct/20/cybercommand-chief-opposesun-net-control/?page=all. ("Last month, Russia, China, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan submitted a
resolution to the U.N. General Assembly calling for giving individual states the right to control
the [nternet. The resolution, submitted Sept. 14, calls for 'an international code of conduct for
information security."'); see International code of conduct for information security, letter
dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, availableat http://www.rusemb.org.uk/policycontact/49.
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path."
I.

5

INTRODUCTION

As the Internet grows increasingly central to commerce and
communications, the debate on Internet governance is likely to become
more intense. Consider, for example, how The Economist framed the
issue:
For something so central to the modem world, the Internet is
shambolically governed. It is run by a hotch-potch of organisations
with three- to five-letter acronyms. Many of their meetings, both
online and offline, are open to the public. Some-like the Internet
Governance Forum...are just talking shops. Decision-making is slow
and often unpredictable.
It is in short a bit chaotic. But sometimes chaos, even one that
adherents like to claim somewhat disingenuously is a "multistakeholder" approach, is not disastrous: the Internet mostly works.
And the shambles is a lot better than the alternative-which nearly
always in this
6 case means governments bringing the Internet under
their control .
Even if a bit hyperbolic, The Economist's depiction is not far off the
mark and highlights a series of important basic questions. For example,
what are these "multistakeholder" organizations? Where do they come
from, and how do they work? What have they accomplished? Do they
live up to the core Internet principles of openness, transparency, and
accountability? What are the limits of their abilities to effectively
govern? Are they, in fact, "better than the alternative" of giving
governments more direct control over the Internet, or must some balance
be struck between the role of MSH organizations and the role of
sovereign governments?
These questions relate to a set of concerns now being raised about
the future of Internet governance. The request by India for United
Nations' oversight of the Internet likely reflects the concern that the
Internet is simply becoming too important to remain outside of sovereign
authority. Another concern may be that many governments in both the
developed and developing worlds perceive that the United Statesdirectly or indirectly--"runs the Internet" through the dominant
participation of its companies and stakeholders in MSH organizations.
5. McCarthy, supra note 3.
6. In Praise Of Chaos: Governments' Attempts To Control The Internet Should Be
Resisted, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 1,2011), http://www.economist.comnode/21531011.
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Whatever the motivation, it is clear that the calls for change from the
current model of Internet governance are becoming more intense and that
the legacy model built around MSH organizations needs further
definition and development.
One crucial forum for discussing these issues will be at the World
Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) under the
auspices of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), to be
held in Dubai in December 2012. 7 At this conference, the ITU will,
among other things, renegotiate the international telecommunications
regulations dating from the 1988 World Administrative Telegraph and
Telephone Conference in Melbourne. 8 In so doing, it may well determine
whether
and how
traditional
governmental
regulation
of
telecommunications will extend into the Internet age.
Given the global importance of the debate over the relative roles of
sovereign governments and MSH organizations in Internet governance,
the Silicon Flatirons Center is in the process of developing a research
agenda intended to foster a better understanding of these critical
questions. The answers will unquestionably determine the operation and
culture of the Internet in the 21 st century.
In an initial effort to flesh out the parameters of this research
agenda, the Silicon Flatirons Center convened a roundtable discussion on
August 24-25, 2011, bringing together an array of thought leaders from
industry, government, civil society, multistakeholder organizations, and
other stakeholders in the Internet ecosystem. 9 The authors have distilled
the primary themes into this essay that frames a research agenda for the
coming years.
This essay proceeds in four parts. After this Introduction, Part II
discusses how MSH organizations operate. Part III frames the research
agenda for the role of MSH in Internet governance. Part IV offers a brief
conclusion.

7. See World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12), ITU,
http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 21,, 2012); see also What
are the ITRs?, ISOC, http://www.isoc.org/pubpolpillar/community/itr.shtml (last visited July
21, 2012) (A brief background on International Telecommunication Regulations prepared by
the Internet Society).
8. ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 21, 2012);
see also Richard Hill & Tony Rutkowski, World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone
Conference (Melbourne, 1988), ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/history/administrativeconferences
/Pages/1988Melbourne.aspx (last visited July 21, 2012).
9. The authors note that the bulk of the roundtable participants were U.S.-based. As will
become apparent, the success of the research agenda depends in significant part on broadening
global engagement and execution of this research agenda.
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II.

WHAT ARE "MULTISTAKEHOLDER ORGANIZATIONS?"

The organizations that "govern" the Internet are as unique as the
Internet itself. The open, global, decentralized nature of the "network of

networks" is reflected in the types of organizations that help to direct its
evolution and operation.
As one roundtable participant put it, the Internet grew up around a
common culture of cooperation, "coming together to solve problems."'
The governing institutions that emerged reflect that culture.

For the most part, MSH organizations do not operate under or
pursuant to formal government authority." MSH organizations have
tended to evolve organically, an outgrowth of various discussions and

conversations in various forums among some of the Internet's earliest
leaders. As the Internet has developed, these organizations have matured
by adopting more or less formal organizational structures to advance
certain identified interests of the Internet community. 12

In some cases, an MSH organization was created to manage an
important Internet resource, e.g., ICANN's role in assigning Internet

domain names.' 3 In many cases, an MSH organization attempts to drive
"rough consensus"' 4 through processes that emphasize openness and
10. Paul Liao, President and CEO, CableLabs, Roundtable Discussion at the Silicon
Flatirons Center (Aug. 24, 2011).
11. The functions of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) were originally conducted by the U.S.-controlled Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA). In 1998, ICANN took on the duties formerly assigned to the then separate
U.S.-controlled IANA, through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S.
Department of Commerce and ICANN to transition management of the Domain Name System
(DNS) from the U.S. government to the global community. See Request for Comments on the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,569 (Feb. 25, 2011),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-register-notices/20 11/request-comments-internetassigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions; see also The Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 34658 (June 14, 2011), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-register-notice/20 11/intemet-assigned-numbers-authorityiana-functions-further-notice-inqui; See, infra note 15.
12. For example, the Internet Society was formed to provide an institutional home and
financial support for the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and its standard-setting
activities were moved out from under the control and support of agencies of the U.S.
government. See Vint Cerf, Histories of the Internet: IETF and the Internet Society,
INTERNETSOCIETY.ORG, (July 18, 1995), http://www.isoc.org/intemet/history/ietfhis.shtml.
13. ICANN's mission is to, among other things, globally coordinate and ensure the
secure operation of the Internet's systems of"unique identifiers" (domain names, IP addresses
and autonomous system numbers, and protocol port and parameter assignments) and to
coordinate the policy development related to these technical functions. See Bylaws for Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers: A California Nonprofit Public-Benefit
Corporation,ICANN (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm#I.
14. For example, the IETF's working groups operate using "rough consensus" rather
than any formal voting-meaning that a "very large majority of those who care must agree"but the exact method of determining consensus can vary from working group to working
group. See P. Hoffman, The Tao of IETF: A Novice's Guide to the Internet Engineering Task
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inclusiveness over formalities. In most cases, the authority of an MSH
organization derives from "the consent of those who5 choose to be
governed," and is not derivative of a sovereign authority. 1
For the most part, MSH organizations bring some degree of order to
how the Internet operates by employing fact-finding and dialogue to
develop voluntary norms and best practices. Their power derives from
respect for their processes-the openness, the flexibility, and the ability
for all voices that can credibly articulate their positions to be heard-and
the quality of their outputs, which are intended to represent broad
stakeholder consensus.
These MSH organizations demonstrate striking heterogeneity,
which makes "defining" an MSH a challenging task. No manual dictates
how to organize or operate an MSH organization. The Silicon Flatirons
roundtable discussion provided an opportunity to develop an initial
understanding of the broad range of Intemet-related MSH organizations
and their characteristics, and whether and how these organizations
interrelate. It also provided an opportunity to evaluate whether and why
an individual MSH organization, and the MSH process as a whole, is
successful. Those discussions are summarized below.
The concept of "multistakeholder": The term does not lend itself
to simple definition, and its application will vary from case to case, but
one would generally expect to see at least two things in a
"multistakeholder" organization: (i) representation (or, at a minimum,
openness to representation) from a diversity of economic and social
interests (and not limited to a single economic perspective), and (ii) a
representational role for civil society, generally defined as relevant
stakeholders other than government and industry. "Diverse" does not
necessarily mean "open" (see below), but it does suggest that a
significant breadth of viewpoints should be represented within the body
of participants. And there may be MSH organizations that do not
formally accommodate or engage civil society because of their highly
specialized nature. While there are no bright lines, these are two

Force, IETF, § 5.2 (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.ietf.org/tao.html.
15. Some MSHs have either directly or indirectly come about through, are proposed to
be brought into existence by, or are deputized by, government. For example, compare
organizations such as the Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group (BITAG)-brought
about indirectly as a response to regulatory interest in Net Neutrality rules with the goal of
bringing greater "clarity to network management process"-with the multistakeholder entities
proposed by the Obama Administration in areas such as privacy and cybersecurity. See BITAG
History, BITAG, http://www.bitag.org/bitagorganization.phpaction=history (last visited July
22, 2012); see also Howard A. Schmidt, The Administration Unveils its Cybersecurity
Legislative Proposal, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 12, 2011, 2:00 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.govIblog/2011/05/12/administration-unveils-its-cybersecuritylegislative-proposal.
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important criteria in assessing
"multistakeholder."

whether

an organization

is truly

"Open": Consistent with the Internet ethos, many MSH
organizations place a premium on "openness" of membership and6
participation. For example, the Internet Engineering Task Force1
("IETF"), a global MSH organization, is open to whomever wishes to
participate and has no formal membership.' 7 ICANN is also open to all
and does not charge any fees to participate in its meetings or bottom-up
policy development and related activities. 8
But "openness" is always relative, as participation in many of these
organizations is frequently gated by resources-not every potential
stakeholder has the financial wherewithal, the technical expertise, or the
ability to commit time and talent to participate in the large and growing
number of MSH organizations. Notably, some sovereign governments
(particularly developing nations) and some in civil society have cited this
concern. Moreover, some significant stakeholder segments-notably, the
content community-have not engaged in MSH processes as fully as
might be expected, in part because of their wariness about some of the
cultural norms of the Internet that they may perceive as inimical to the
protection of intellectual property rights.
In some cases, membership organizations attempt to provide
resources to ensure participation by otherwise qualified stakeholder
interests that might lack sufficient funding. For instance, the Broadband
Internet Technical Advisory Group' 9 ("BITAG") sets aside funds from
its general treasury to reimburse engineering and technical
representatives of "community organizations" (i.e., organizations
representing civil society as defined above) to enable them to participate
in committees of BITAG's Technical Working Group.
Another challenge to "openness" is the risk of capture, which can
happen in an MSH no less than in a more formal regulatory body. For
example, efforts to "pack" working groups with stakeholders advocating
a particular point of view can skew the direction of a group in ways
beyond the merits of the argument.
"Geographic reach": Many of the established MSH organizations
fashion themselves as global in reach, and a large number of them can
point to board structures that include members from several continents,
as well as a commitment to bring their gatherings to different nations
16. The Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF, http://www.ietf.org/ (last visited July
22, 2012).
17. Hoffman, supra note 14, at § 1.
18. See About ICANN, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/ (last visited July 22,
2012).
19. See BITAG, http://www.bitag.org/ (last visited July 22, 2012).
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each year. But numerous MSH organizations are primarily, if not
exclusively, focused on Internet operations in one or a small number of
nations. BITAG, for example, focuses chiefly on Internet issues with
potential public policy implications within the U.S. The Copyright Alert
System2 ° (overseen by the Center for Copyright Information) is a
cooperative effort among U.S. Internet service providers on the one
hand, and video and music content providers (some of which are based
outside the U.S.) on the other, to address piracy that uses peer-to-peer
networks. Because the Internet is a global network, there are strong
arguments in favor of MSH organizations having a global focus and
inclusiveness. Nonetheless, the MSH model is an effective tool for
addressing legitimate Internet-related policy issues within specific
territories, such as privacy, piracy, and cybersecurity. It is thus important
to reconcile the role and outputs of both types of MSH organizations.
Process and Outputs: MSH organizations have a wide range of
potential outputs and use a variety of processes to develop those outputs.
In some cases, effective management of Internet resources (e.g., the
Internet root zone file and IP numbering resources by ICANN) is the
primary output. In other cases, the output may be standards-setting, "best
practices" recommendations, or codes of conduct. Given that many MSH
organizations are consensus-based, products of those bodies generally
have a powerful claim to legitimacy. But consensus can take time, and
stalemates are possible. Some MSH organizations define "consensus"
based on some form of voting as a primary or fallback mechanism for
approving outputs. Voting necessarily introduces elements of politics and
puts dissent on the record. Where consensus processes can result in
agreed-upon best practices and recommendations, the "soft power"
governance model of many MSH organizations can have the significant
advantage of building support for the agreed-upon approach.
governments:
Should MSH
to sovereign
Relationship
organizations work with sovereign governments, and, if so, when and
how? There are wide variations in how they currently do so. In some
cases, an MSH organization derives its power from sovereign
governments; in many cases, its power derives solely from the consent of
those who agree to be governed. In some cases, the MSH exercises its
20. Press Release, Center for Copyright Information, Music, Movie, TV and Broadband
Leaders Team to Curb Online Content Theft: Announce Common Framework for "Copyright
Alerts" (July 7, 2011), available at http://www.copyrightinformation.org/node/704. The
Center for Copyright Information assists in the implementation and enforcement of a new
Copyright Alert System intended to reduce theft of digital goods through the use of peer-topeer protocols. Id. CCI has its genesis in discussions convened by then-Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo (D-NY) that brought together Internet Service Providers and representatives
of the motion picture and music industries to discuss more effective enforcement against such
theft. Id.
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power on behalf of a sovereign government to further a governmentidentified policy goal; in many cases, the MSH exercises its power
through and on behalf of the aggregate body of participating stakeholders
who agree to be bound to one another through the consensus guidelines
and may also voluntarily adopt the resulting standards and practices.
For example, governments have a formal role within ICANN
through its Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC).2' ICANN's
bylaws require the Board to consider GAC advice and, in the event that it
decides to take action inconsistent with that advice, to work with the
GAC to find a mutually satisfactory solution.22 The IETF, consistent with
its philosophy of "openness," welcomes representatives of sovereign
governments, but treats their perspective as only "one voice among
many." They are not accorded any particular deference and are expected
to have the technical skills to engage and earn their credibility, as must
any participating stakeholder. BITAG, as a U.S-based membership
organization, currently provides membership opportunities to five
categories of stakeholders: Internet connectivity providers, content
companies, technology and software companies, equipment companies,
and community representatives (including representatives of academia,
advocacy organizations, and other MSHs). The group's charter neither
precludes nor formally provides for government participation.
While BITAG is intended to derive consensus resolutions of
technical issues with public policy implications, it has no formal
relationship with any government agency. It is not formed under or
governed by the U.S. Federal Advisory Committee Act; 23 therefore, it is
continuing to explore exactly how it should relate to federal agencies.
In other cases, governments seek to delegate certain responsibilities
to MSH organizations, or may even seek to stand up such organizations,
to develop codes or standards of conduct in various subject matter areas
(e.g., privacy, piracy, cybersecurity). Governments may also play a
backstop role, e.g., by exercising enforcement authority over

21. ICANN, supra note 13, at Art. XI.
22. Id.; see also Board-GACConsultations, ICANN,
http://newgtlds.icann.org/about/historical-documentation/board-gac-consultations (last visited
July 22, 2012); see also ICANN's Expansion of Top Level Domains: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Fiona
M. Alexander, Assoc. Admin., Office of Internal Affairs Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin.,
U.S. Dep't of Cong.), available at http://ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/201 l/testimonyassociate-administrator-alexander-icann-s-expansion-top-level-domains.
23. The Federal Advisory Committee Act governs how the Executive Branch of the U.S.
government and independent agencies use committees, boards, commissions, councils, and
other similar groups to gather expert advice and opinions. See Federal Advisory Committee
Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2 (2012), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/laws/fedadvisory-committee/.

J. ON TELECOMM & HIGH TECH. L.

(Vol. 10

stakeholders who participate in the MSH organizations and who have
agreed to abide by such codes or standards.24
Subject matter coordination among MSH organizations: In
many cases, the scope of activity of certain MSH organizations is
reasonably well established (e.g., domain names under ICANN, network
standards and practices under IETF, IP peering and interconnection25
policies under the North American Network Operators Group
("NANOG")). Nonetheless, even with MSH organizations such as the
Internet Advisory Board and the IETF that have organizational and
funding lines running back to a parent organization (in this case, the
Internet Society), it is not always clear which MSH organizations have
authority to act in which subject matter areas. Similarly, it is rarely clear
whether and how the potentially interrelated actions of various
organizations are coordinated with one another. Consider, for example,
that there are some subject matters (e.g., privacy) where there is a
proliferation of MSH organizations (or organizations with MSH
attributes) acting as conveners, while there are other areas where no
single MSH organization has a clearly identified convening role (e.g.,
cryptography).
As the foregoing suggests, it is challenging to adopt an authoritative
definition of a multistakeholder organization. Nonetheless, the
roundtable participants suggested various defining characteristics. The
White House's Danny Weitzner, himself a veteran of many years'
involvement in MSH organizations, suggested that MSH organizationsespecially those that are engineering-based-are typified by "a set of
values on resolving issues." He also cited the importance of leadership,
the proper tone, and the value of continuity. He suggested that a certain
number of personalities have come to the fore in these organizations,
establishing an open, problem-solving culture, and finding ways to
propagate these character traits throughout their organizations. Michael
Powell, former FCC chair and current president of the National Cable &
Telecommunications Association, reinforced that "people matter," and
said the special role of MSH organizations is to acculturate "stakeholders
to think in a consensus-based manner." Jamie Hedlund of ICANN added
that it is essential for an MSH organization to establish ethics rules
governing matters such as disclosures and recusals early on in the
process. Other roundtable participants highlighted the importance of
having a clear mission statement and purpose, which is particularly
important in persuading stakeholders to participate and to dedicate
24. See Schmidt, supra note 15; see also DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, infra note 30;
see also National Advertising Review Board, infra note 26.
25. NANOG, http://www.nanog.org/ (last visited July 22, 2012).
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resources.
III.

A RESEARCH AGENDA ON MULTISTAKEHOLDER
ORGANIZATIONS

With the help of the roundtable participants, this essay outlines a
research agenda on multistakeholder organizations and their
Going forward,
interrelationship with sovereign governments.
policymakers will need to consider and address a series of important
questions.
A. MSH Processes and Internet Governance
An initial challenge is addressing the fundamental task of
cataloguing all of the MSH organizations that play a role in Internet
governance. As noted, there is no manual or framework for organizing an
MSH organization, and there likely never could be one. In the open,
collaborative, and entrepreneurial spirit of the Internet, MSH
organizations tend to come together when various stakeholders identify a
need and create an organizational effort to fill it.
A research effort intended to identify and describe the broadest
identifiable range of such organizations is a critical starting point. As this
is achieved, it will be important to analyze (i) what the organizations do,
(ii) how they do it, and (iii) what characteristics, values, and best
practices are widely shared among these organizations. It would be
useful to undertake case studies to understand the circumstances under
which MSH organizations are "successful"-including how best to
measure success. In conducting the survey of MSH organizations, it will
be important to compare (i) each group's stated function, (ii) the scope
and scale of the problem(s) it is intended to address, (iii) the diversity of
participation and the incentives to participate, (iv) the role of, or relation
to, sovereign government entities, and (v) the resources available to the
MSH organization and to its participants/members to carry out their
charge.
With regard to what the organizations do and how they do it, there
are a number of potential roles for MSH groups-they may set best
practices, norms and standards with no direct government involvement
(e.g., IETF), they may seek to inform the Internet community and
government entities by providing declaratory judgments and providing
guidance on "safe harbors" (under delegated authority, with sovereign
oversight or backstop), or they may engage in certification or
adjudication/enforcement activities (e.g., the National Advertising
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Review Board in the U.S.). 26 In some cases, an MSH organization may
both legislate (establish norms or practices) and enforce or certify,
though some roundtable participants representing MSH organizations
made strong arguments for keeping these functions separate.
An important and related issue is the need to develop a clear
understanding of the limits of MSH governance. While the format has
utility in dealing with many aspects of Internet governance and policy,
there is a case to be made that certain roles played by sovereign
government cannot be appropriately abandoned or delegated, in whole or
in part. Later in this section, we present some key questions about the
interrelationship of MSH organizations and government.
In considering how MSH organizations work, the roles and
functions of organizations may be carried out in a variety of ways. Some
organizations place a premium on "openness" of process and may seek to
accommodate active participation by every interested stakeholder. Some
are "membership" organizations with varying board and membership
structures. Structures may vary with the charter and goals of the group,
and the heterogeneity of structures is worth exploring and understanding
with an eye towards their strengths and weaknesses.
With regard to the characteristics, values, and best practices of MSH
organizations, roundtable participants identified the following factors as
a useful starting point for further examination:
* Openness (to diverse and divergent interests, facilitating
direct participation or appropriate representation of all
interested and impacted parties);
* Transparency (of the decision-making process, of
documents, of outcomes);
* Accessibility (creating mechanisms for all potentially
affected stakeholders to have meaningful substantive
engagement);
* Accountability and measurement (the capacity to
demonstrate that the MSH process works fairly and
consistent with its mission, and it is yielding results);
* Credibility (widespread recognition and acceptance of the
MSH organization's processes and outcomes);
" Data-driven (decisions are based to the greatest possible
extent on objective data and evidence);
* Adequately resourced (both the MSH organization itself
and the stakeholder participants);
26. The National Advertising Review Board (NARB) is the "appeal division of the
advertising industry's self-regulatory system." See National Advertising Review Board,
NARB, http://www.narbreview.org/ (last visited July 22, 2012).
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Consensus-based (a priority on wrangling issues until
meaningful consensus is reached, with the possibility of a
backstop "voting process" when necessary to avoid
stalemate);
* Governed by clear and acceptable intellectual property
policies (in those circumstances where the adoption of
standards may implicate patents);
* Opportunity for appeal/challenge (some appropriate intraor extra-organizational level of review intended to bolster
confidence in the MSH process and seek corrections where
justified);
* Ability to resist capture (balanced against "openness,"
ensuring that decisional meetings cannot be packed, and
that the process cannot otherwise be unfairly skewed to
favor certain participants); and
* Endorsement, recognition, or direct participation by
sovereign governments (while this very notion may be
anathema to some MSH organizations-which sometimes
wear their separateness from governments as a badge of
honor-winning respect from sovereign governments can
build credibility and participation and makes it more likely
that the "Internet culture" will be accepted by
governments).
It is also useful to determine whether the line can appropriately be
drawn between MSH organizations, on the one hand, and "selfregulatory" organizations, on the other. The latter are generally
organized by a particular industry or industry segment, often as
membership organizations, that develop codes or best practices and hold
participating/signatory companies accountable for compliance. They can
generally be distinguished from MSH organizations that do not limit
input or participation to members of the self-policing industry segment.
Indeed, a defining characteristic of MSH organization bodies is that they
welcome broader input and participation. In some cases, MSH bodies
can, unlike pure self-regulatory efforts, operate with the approval of or in
coordination with governmental policy initiatives.27
The preceding research agenda lays the ground for an assessment of
the purpose, best use, and role MSH organizations and processes play to
advance Internet governance. Three critical questions to ask in evaluating
the case for relying on an MSH organization to serve a governing role
are whether it can (i) build trust, knowledge, and expertise among a
27. For a discussion of this issue, see Philip J. Weiser, The Future ofInternet Regulation,
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529 (2009).
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diverse set of interests, (ii) bring the characteristics and values outlined
above to the process of Internet governance, and (iii) bring greater
flexibility, adaptability, speed, or efficiency to the governance process
than is possible using traditional tools of government-thereby fostering
innovation in policy-making.25
At the same time, the challenges or barriers to the success of an
MSH organization should be identified, and the means for meeting the
challenges should be developed. Research that demonstrates when and
how the MSH process plays a legitimate role could be instrumental in
29
persuading governments to overcome their concerns about legitimacy.
Some formative challenges that MSH organizations face are easily
identified. Notably, the success of such bodies depends upon their ability
to build a culture of trust, cooperation, and leadership, which can become
more difficult as the stakeholder base becomes broader and more diverse.
With greater openness to members, MSH bodies must also minimize the
risk of forum-packing, which can become a challenge when an
organization's ground rules permit disproportionate representation that
may introduce dimensions of politics into its processes. When an MSH
body succeeds in generating broad industry participation, it consequently
must manage potential antitrust and competition concerns and avoid
intentionally or inadvertently overstepping appropriate bounds of
cooperation. Given that governments generally do not provide funding
for such bodies (whether and when they should do so is another
appropriate inquiry), MSH bodies are presented with the challenge of
securing an adequate and sustainable funding base in ways that do not
create the appearance or the reality of capture or undue influence.
Finally, such bodies must address intellectual property issues,
particularly where the process of setting norms or standards could give a
stakeholder an unfair advantage, put the property holder's rights at risk,
or adversely affect the community of adopters.

28. A number of roundtable participants stressed the particular value of MSH
organizations at a time when many governments are increasingly challenged to find consensus
and make important policy decisions "in Internet time."
29. In a speech on this topic, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and
Information Larry Strickling stated, "The United States strongly supports the use of a
multistakeholder process as the preferred means of addressing Internet policy issues. We have
been active in promoting the multistakeholder model in the international arena through our
work at ICANN and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)."
Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Sec. of Commerce for Commc'n and Info., Remarks at the
Practising Law Institute's 29th Annual Telecom. Policy & Reg. Conf. (Dec. 9, 2011),
available at http://ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2011/remarks-assistant-secretary-stricklingpractising-law-institutes-29th-annual-te.
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Governments and MSH Institutions and Processes

The U.S. Government and fellow nation-state members of the the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have
actively embraced the role of MSH organizations as appropriate, and
generally superior, tools of Internet governance as compared to
traditional models of regulation. In the United States, confidence in such
processes can explain why the Obama Administration has called for the
government to create or empower existing MSH organizations to conduct
norm-setting, certification, or enforcement activities around issues such
as privacy and cybersecurity.3 °
The research agenda set forth above can provide important guidance
to the governments of the U.S. and the OECD member states in
determining whether, when, and how to encourage the use of MSH
organizations. Related research can provide better strategies for
strengthening the role of MSH institutions in those situations where they
are the best choice, including exploration of the following approaches:
* "Nudging" stakeholders to engage in existing MSH
organizations, or to help create new ones, through the bully
pulpit or informal pressure (though some roundtable
participants raised the concern that, in some cases, a
regulator's nudge may be based on a whim rather than
official, formal Administration or agency policy);
* Providing recognition or encouragement (official or semiofficial reassurance that the success of the MSH process
obviates the need for unnecessarily intrusive government
involvement in the issue);
" Providing "a role at the table" in policy development (in
circumstances where government feels it must act and
cannot defer to the MSH process, giving standing to an
MSH organization to help shape the policy);
* Procurement
policy
(conditioning
purchases
on
participation in or compliance with norms established by an
MSH organization);
* Post-hoc enforcement (providing a "regulatory backstop" in
the event that compliance by a party with an MSH
organization's norms or standards cannot otherwise be
enforced);
30. See Schmidt, supra note 15; see also DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNET
POLICY TASK FORCE, CYBERSECURITY, INNOVATION AND THE ECONOMY (JUNE 2011) (the
Commerce Department's proposal for a new policy framework to strengthen cybersecurity
protections for businesses online), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/2011 /june/cybersecuritygreen paper finalversion_0.pdf
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Standard-setting or rulemaking (formally embracing the
norms and standards developed by an MSH organization as
a standard or rule); and
Research and development funding (similarly conditioning
such grants on compliance with an MSH organization's
norms).

C. MSH Organizationsand Global Legitimacy
In the wake of the OECD's Statement of Principles on Internet
policy,3 it bears consideration whether and how MSH bodies can
provide a superior forum for governance and an alternative to traditional
command-and-control regulation. The OECD's conclusion reflects the
view that stakeholders can establish and propagate Internet norms on a
global basis that are more legitimate, and yield better results, than
attempting to govern the Internet through treaties or territorial
regulations that undermine the notion of "one Internet." To be sure, such
a view allows for the possibility that government entities such as the UN
(and its subsidiary, the ITU) can play an important and legitimate role in
certain Internet-related issues in a fashion that seeks to minimize the role
of government in the Internet.
For the OECD's vision of Internet governance to become a reality,
there are a number of important challenges, such as those discussed
above, that must be addressed and overcome. It is self-evidently not
sufficient to simply try to appeal to notions of "limited government" to
win a global debate on Internet governance. Therefore, for the OECD
vision to prevail, a core challenge is to gain acceptance by all nations of
the role of MSH organizations.
As policymakers and researchers evaluate how to develop a more
robust understanding of, and the case for, the MSH mode of governance,
a threshold step is to document and demonstrate results from such a
process. By so doing, they can demonstrate why an open, transparent,
multistakeholder process can address Internet-related issues in a manner
that is, in many or most cases, more efficient, more effective, more
legitimate, and more global than the effort of governments (or even
international governmental bodies) while addressing legitimate
governmental concerns.
A second critical step in the effort to bolster the case for the MSH
mode of governance is to remove the mystery from the MSH process.
While the Internet has fueled a proliferation of MSH organizations, the

31. OECD, Communiqud on Principles for Internet Policy-Making (June 2011),
available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/12/48387430.pdf.

INTERNET GOVERNANCE

notion of such organizations certainly predates the Internet. Working to
analogize organizations that help govern the Internet to other familiar
types of MSH organizations would give governments a better basis for
understanding and trusting MSH processes.
A third step is to identify ways for the MSH processes to truly scale
globally. This is vital both to overcome the perception (and oftentimes
the reality) that MSH organizations are U.S.-centric, and to find ways to
mentor stakeholder involvement from nations (particularly, but not only,
developing nations) whose participation in MSH organizations has been
limited due to resources or other constraints.
Finally, the very term "multistakeholder organization" may create a
cultural barrier to understanding and acceptance. Particularly in the
developing world, the notion of convening a richly representative
gathering of industry, government, and civil society to develop norms,
discuss problems, and seek consensus solutions may literally be
foreign.32 It may be necessary to develop an alternate term to bridge that
barrier, while also educating leaders of sovereign governments in the
operations and successes of the MSH approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
Multistakeholder organizations exist in many parts of diplomacy,
society, and commerce, but they are particularly integral to the culture of
the Internet and its remarkably successful development. While MSH
organizations rightly applaud themselves on their accomplishments and
their commitment to an open, global Internet and to broad involvement
by the Internet community, there are those in government, in civil
society, and in elements of industry who remain skeptical of how MSH
organizations work, whether they are truly representative, accountable,
and responsible, and whether it remains appropriate to cede key elements
of Internet governance to them, or to repose even more responsibility in
them.
If the shared vision of the U.S. government and OECD member
states with regard to the ongoing central role for MSH-based governance
is to become broadly accepted, a new wave of research is needed to
better understand how MSH organizations engage in Internet
governance, where they operate effectively, and where they fall short of
the mark. It is also important to determine when an MSH organization
may, or may not, be the right tool for the job.33 And to the extent that
32. While some participants noted there is substantial participation by developing
countries in the Internet Governance Forum, that same level of participation does not hold true
with regard to many other MSH organizations.
33. One roundtable participant, Professor Paul Ohm, observed that it is difficult to build
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MSH organizations are the right tool for advancing critical public policy
issues in the Internet environment, it will be important to establish an
understanding as to whether, when, and how sovereign governments
should defer to MSH processes, should themselves be recognized as
stakeholders in such processes, and should empower or backstop such
processes.

a multistakeholder organization around the issue of cybersecurity because one group of key
stakeholders who will never "come to the table" and join the relevant discussions are the
"evildoers." Paul Ohm, IT/[P & Privacy Initiative Director, Silicon Flatirons Center,
Roundtable Discussion at the Silicon Flatirons Center (Aug. 24, 2011).
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APPENDIX A - ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS
(ALPHABETICAL BY LAST NAME)

Trent Adams, The Internet Society (ISOC)
Dorothy Attwood, Walt Disney Company
Brad Bemthal, Silicon Flatirons; Colorado Law
Kathy Brown, Verizon Communications, Inc.
Jeff Brueggeman, AT&T
Mark Cooper, Silicon Flatirons; Consumer Federation of America
Andy Crain, Silicon Flatirons; ITP
Donna Dodson, National Institute of Standards & Technology
Gary Epstein, The Aspen Institute
Ray Gifford, Silicon Flatirons; Wilkinson Barker Knauer, LLP
Dick Green, Silicon Flatirons; ITP; Liberty Global
Dale Hatfield, Silicon Flatirons; ITP; Broadband Internet Technical
Advisory Group (BITAG)
Jamie Hedlund, ICANN
Brian Hendricks, Nokia Siemens Networks
Link Hoewing, Verizon Communications, Inc.
Russ Housley, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Karen Kornbluh, US Department of State
Paul Liao, CableLabs
Chris Libertelli, Skype
Jason Livingood, Comcast Cable Communications
Roger Marks, Consensii LLC
Melissa Newman, CenturyLink
Paul Ohm, Silicon Flatirons; Colorado Law
Preston Padden, Silicon Flatirons; Colorado Law; ITP
Robert Pepper, Cisco
Michael Powell, National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n
Phil Reitinger, Sony
Jim Rottsolk, Microsoft
Patrick Ryan, Google
Jonathan Sallet, Silicon Flatirons; O'Melveny & Myers LLP
Doug Sicker, Federal Communications Commission
Kaleb Sieh, Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group (BITAG)
Phil Verveer, US Department of State
Scott Wallsten, Technology Policy Institute
Joe Waz, Silicon Flatirons; Altura West LLC
Phil Weiser, Silicon Flatirons; Colorado Law
Danny Weitzner, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Cynthia Wong, Center for Democracy & Technology
Lee Zieroth, CableLabs
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